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INSIDER TRADING REGULATION AND THE
PRODUCTION OF INFORMATION:
THEORY AND EVIDENCE
JAMES D. COX*
The traditional view of managers who formulate disclosure policy for
publicly traded corporations is currently embodied in the mandatory dis-
closure rules of the federal securities laws: periodic reporting require-
ments are mandated because managers lack sufficient incentives to
disclose trustworthy, confidential corporate information.1 Further un-
derscoring the necessity of mandatory disclosure rules is the widely held
fear that managers will disclose material information only after they have
exploited its values for their private gain. Thus the necessity to assure
that insiders do not selfishly appropriate the advantage of their natural
monopoly over corporate information partially justifies the disclosure
rules.-
The major rejoinder to the traditional view is the "free market" ap-
proach, which counsels that wealth maximizing managers will release in-
formation up to the point that the marginal benefits of disclosure equal
the marginal costs.3 The "free market" view assumes that managers will
* Professor of Law, Duke University. The author is grateful for the support of the E.T. Bost
Research Professorship during the preparation of this Article.
I Manipulation through delay and nonstandardized reporting practices are emphasized in the
legislative reports accompanying the enacting of the periodic reporting provisions mandated in the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. See H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, 11-12 (1934); S.
REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). An excellent description of the many abuses prompting
the enactment of the federal securities laws appears in J. SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF
WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPO-
RATE FINANCE 1-72 (1982). Professor Seligman also has compiled the most comprehensive exami-
nation of the arguments in support of mandatory corporate disclosure. See Seligman, The Historical
Need For a Mandatory Disclosure System, 9 J. CORP. L. 1 (1983).
2. This is frequently a justification for prohibiting insider trading. See e.g., Schotland, Unsafe
at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market, 53 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1448-
49 (1967); Scott, Insider Trading: Rule lO-b, Disclosure and Corporate Privacy, 9 J. LEG. STUD. 801,
810-11 (1980).
3. If one were to take account only to the volume of scholarship advocating this view,
mandatory disclosure would appear to have a very attenuated future. See, eg., H. MANNE & E.
SOLOMON, WALL STREET IN TRANSITION: THE EMERGING SYSTEM AND ITS IMPACT ON THE
ECONOMY (1974); S. Ross, DISCLOSURE REGULATION IN FINANCIAL MARKETS: IMPLICATIONS
OF MODERN FINANCE THEORY AND SIGNALING THEORY IN ISSUES IN FINANCIAL REGULATION
177 (Edwards ed. 1979); Easterbrook & Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure And The Protection oflnves-
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disclose in order to maximize their own utility. Utility maximization is
an interesting problem in the public corporation because stockholders
and managers are different sets of individuals. Therefore, the managers'
interest in maximizing their own utility is not always concentric with the
stockholders' desire that the managers should maximize the firm's
value.4 This classic problem of "separation of ownership from control"
sets in motion the powerful, albeit natural, forces which sometimes cause
managers to maximize their utility at the stockholders' expense.' Simply
illustrated, the manager who owns a half percent of his company's stock
gains only fifty dollars by locating and directing a new business opportu-
nity worth $10,000 to the company. If, however, he appropriates the
advantage exclusively for himself, his personal wealth' will increase by
$9,950 above that he would enjoy had he acted to increase the firm's
value. Adherents to the "free market" view salve their unease over the
tors, 70 VA. L. REv. 669 (1984); Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 132, 134 (1973). Benston concludes that
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 did not alter the riskiness of securities markets from their level
prior to its enactment. Id. at 145-49. Benston, however, proceeds on the questionable assumption
that the forces at work in the pre-1934 market are identical to those in the seven years studied after
its enactment. Moreover, upon close examination of his data, Benston's findings equally support the
view that the Exchange Act reduced the market's overall riskiness. Stigler, Public Regulation of the
Securities Markets, 37 J. Bus. 117 (1964). For an excellent critique of the empirical bases of the
"free market" view, see Seligman, supra note 1. See also Coffee, Market Failure and the Economic
Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REV. 717 (1984). It should be emphasized that
management's disclosure need not be made directly to investors, but more frequently occurs through
financial intermediaries. For example, favorable future prospects may be disclosed only to the firm's
underwriter in making its preparation to go public. The underwriter will use the information to
price the security. Even though not disclosed in the prospectus covering the public offering, inves-
tors relying upon the underwriter's reputation will acquire the security with a belief that underwrit-
ers would not have established such a price unless armed with material nonpublic information.
Easterbrook & Fischel, supra, at 688.
4. At the heart of this view is the emerging field of agency theory, whose seminal work is
Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Struc-
ture, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). Other foundational works are: Fama, Agency Problems and the
Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980); Ross, The Economic Theory of Agency: The
Principal's Problems, AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC., May 1973, at 134; Alchian & Demsetz,
Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972); Spence
& Zeckhauser, Insurance, Information, and Individual Action, AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC.,
May 1971, at 380.
5. While managers' departures from the goal of maximizing the firm's value have long been
laid on the cleavage between ownership and management, a view popularized by A. BERLE & G.
MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932), not all deviations can be so
blamed. Concern for management discretion is merited whenever weaknesses exist in competitive
conditions so that managers enjoy considerable discretion in developing business strategies. 0. WIL-
LIAMSON, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRETIONARY BEHAVIOR (1964).
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cleavage between the interests of owners and managers with their faith
that the parties can contract to provide the incentives necessary for man-
agers to act in an optimal manner.6 Such contracting necessarily impli-
cates disclosure because owners need information to determine whether
their managers are fulfilling their contractual obligations.
The process of contracting is made difficult by the information asym-
metries that characterize securities markets. Because managers of public
corporations hold a natural monopoly over insider information, their
obeisance to their contractual obligations is uniquely within their knowl-
edge, except as may be revealed through their disclosures about the firm's
performance. Absent a provision in their contract for disclosure of items
relevant in evaluating their stewardship of the firm, managers have both
the exclusive discretion and the natural incentive to report those items
which are in their interests and to conceal matters which are not to their
benefit.
The federal securities laws, however, have eroded much of the man-
ager's natural monopoly over information regarding the firm's past per-
formance and current financial position. The securities laws have
thereby given stockholders better information about their managers'
achievements and possible transgressions. The federal securities laws
compel the periodic reporting of completed events,7 which means the fo-
cus of the laws is upon the disclosure of information which is easiest to
6. The manager will continue to accede to the owners' contractual demands which curb the
managers' abuses so long as whatever compliance with the owners' demands nets for the manager is
a unit of wealth more valuable than the managerial prerequisites or abuses foregone. Jensen &
Meckling, supra note 4, at 326. And from the owners' view, incentives and other devices to curb the
manager's abuses will be undertaken to the point that their marginal benefits equal the marginal cost
of each additional step. In a world in which owners derive declining marginal benefits and increas-
ing marginal costs associated with curbing nondesirable managerial behavior, some abuses cannot
only be expected but are optimal. Id. at 327-28. These so-called agency costs are therefore im-
pounded in the investor's assessment of the firm's value when considering whether to invest in its
securities and at what price. From this brief description, it is easy to envision that the problem of
contracting is indeed a formidable one. See Holmstrom, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL
J. ECON. 74 (1979); Ross, supra note 4; Shavell, Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and
Agency Relationship, 10 BELL J. ECON. 55 (1979).
7. Section 13(a)(2) of the Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78(m)(a), requires all issuers of equity
securities subject to § 12's registration requirements, 15 U.S.C. § 78(m)(a)(2), (g)(1), to file annual
and quarterly reports. Although the accounting information in the annual reports is prepared in
accordance with generally accepted accounting principles and is certified after an audit to comply
with those principles, the quarterly reports do not purport to reflect either an audit or generally
accepted accounting principles. They are therefore subject to greater control by management than
are the annual reports. See generally J. Cox, FINANCIAL INFORMATION, ACCOUNTING AND THE
LAW 489-90 (1980).
Number 21
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regulate. These events have occurred or items are in existence against
which the firm's auditors can verify the reported transaction or item.
Similarly, comparisons can be made if the disclosure is subsequently
claimed to be fraudulent. In a sense, both auditors and potential liability
serve to authenticate the otherwise bold assertions of managers regarding
their stewardship of the firm.8
Except in rare cases, the federal securities laws do not compel disclo-
sure of events or acts that are expected, but have not yet occurred.9 Such
forward-based information, the most common being financial forecasts, is
essentially unregulated. Authenticity is a more serious problem for this
type of information than it is for information compelled to be disclosed
under the federal securities laws, because an inherent characteristic of
forward-based information is the absence of objectively verifiable, com-
pleted events which independent parties can examine or test. ° External
8. Auditing appears to be one of the very earliest devices used to reduce the manager's agency
costs for the benefit of the firm's remote owners. See Watts & Zimmerman, Agency Problems, Audi-
tors, and the Theory of the Firm: Some Evidence, 26 J. L. & ECON. 613 (1983). Liability for materi-
ally misleading financial statements has been seen as a form of warranty which honest firms can
more economically attach to their statements than can firms whose books are falsified. See Beaver,
The Nature of Mandated Disclosure, in SEC ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE,
REPORT OF RECOMMENDATIONS 618, 637-39 (1977).
9. Courts have not required internal forecasts to be disclosed, even though the corporation
was itself engaged in an offer to acquire shares from its stockholders. Coyne v. MSL Ind., [1975-76
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 95,451 (N.D. Ill. 1976). See also Fisher v. Plessey Co.,
[1982-83 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,129 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). However, reliable
asset appraisals in the hands of one contemplating the liquidation of the corporation must be dis-
closed in connection with seeking shareholder approval of a merger which was a step toward the
defendants' plan to capture the firm's hidden liquidation value. Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc.,
478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973). Asset appraisals that are believed speculative or otherwise unreliable
need not be disclosed by the control person who seeks to acquire the minority stockholders' shares.
See, e.g., Flynn v. Bass Bros. Enters., Inc., 744 F.2d 978 (3rd Cir. 1984); Biechele v. Cedar Point,
Inc., 747 F.2d 209 (6th Cir. 1984).
10. This quality caused the SEC for nearly 40 years to justify its prohibition of financial fore-
casts in SEC filings. A thorough critique of the SEC's position on forward looking information is
found in Manne, Accounting and Administrative Law Aspects of Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 15
N.Y. L.F. 304 (1969). The SEC's policy became more flexible in 1972 when it began a lengthy and
controversial administrative process, see J. Cox, FINANCIAL INFORMATION, ACCOUNTING AND
THE LAW 268 (1980), which led ultimately to the adoption of a safe harbor rule for financial fore-
casts included in SEC filings. 17 C.F.R. § 230.175. See generally Note, The SEC Safe Harbor for
Forecasts-A Step in the Right Direction?, 1980 DUKE L.J. 607. Although assumptions and proce-
dures managers employ in preparing a forecast can be externally examined, such examination and
verification occur with the significant caveat that the process is an unreliable one and does not in-
clude verification of the events and assumptions underlying the forecast. For example, under the
language currently proposed for the accountant's opinion accompanying a financial projection, the
independent accountant states, "some assumptions inevitably will not materialize and unanticipated
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol64/iss2/5
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certification, therefore, is not a reasonable response to the authenticity
problem which forward-based information poses. Moreover, the mere
difference between the forecasted amount and the level actually achieved
during the forecast period does not mean that the manager fraudulently
prepared the forecast so that liability should attach.11 Indeed, forecasts
rarely expose their preparers to liability regardless of how much they are
in error.'2
The proponents of the "free market" view do not share these concerns
over the production or authenticity of forward-based information. 3
Each concern is viewed as a question of managerial incentives, for which
they offer the suggestion that deregulation of insider trading rules would
likely encourage managers to disclose corporate information. Moreover,
proponents of the "free market" view have even suggested that insider
trading can also serve to authenticate corporate disclosures by serving to
bond their accuracy. 4
Because the federal securities laws do not compel disclosure of for-
events and circumstances may occur; therefore, the actual results achieved during the projection
period will vary from the projection, and the variations may be materially." AICPA AUDITING
STANDARDS BOARDS, PROPOSED AUTHORITATIVE STATEMENT PROSPECTIVE FINANCIAL STATE-
MENTS f 28 (1984).
1 . See, e.g., Marx v. Computer Sciences Corp., 507 F.2d 485, 489 (9th Cir. 1974); Digital
Equip. See. Litig. [1984-85 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec L. Rep. (CCH) 91, 991 (D.C. Mass. 1985);
REA Express, Inc. v. Interway Corp., 410 F. Supp. 192, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)..
12. The few cases in which a financial prediction has been held to violate the federal securities
laws invariably have occurred when management has proferred an optimistic report while being
aware of unfavorable business conditions which were inconsistent with the assumptions underlying
the forecast. See Goldman v. Belden, [1984-85 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,950
(2d Cir. 1985); Sunstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp. 553 F.2d 1033, 1040 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 875 (1977) (projection was recklessly prepared and was but one of many false utterances re-
leased by the defendants); Marx v. Computer Servs. Corp., 507 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1974) (decision
rendered that forecast was carelessly or recklessly prepared but its holding is questionable today
after the Supreme Court's holding in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), that liability
under the antifraud provision cannot be based upon proof of mere negligence); Beecher v. Able, 374
F. Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). See generally, Fiflis, Soft Information: The SEC's Former Exogenous
Zone, 26 UCLA L. REV. 95, 118-27 (1978).
13. See, e.g., Carlton & Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857, 867-
68 & 879 (1983) (ability to trade on insider information encourages management to undertake
wealth maximizing discretionary corporate acts and is consistent with the early announcement of
their acts).
14. See, eg., Dye, Insider Trading and Incentives, 57 J. Bus. 295 (1984) (insider trading is one
way owners can improve earnings-contingent contracts with their managers); Leland & Pyle, Infor-
mation Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation, 32 J. FIN. 371 (1977) (po-
tential welfare costs, however, seen if insiders invest more in their corporation than otherwise so that
wealth is redistributed in favor of insiders and at the expense of outsiders).
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ward-based information and the standard methods for their authentica-
tion work poorly the "free market" view remains the exclusive approach
for its study. This Article offers a "free market" explanation of the
forces which stimulate the production of the most important form of for-
ward-based information, a company's financial forecast. Part I considers
the social value of forecasts, a question requiring an affirmative answer if
further questions of how to stimulate their production are to be raised.
Part II addresses the problem of the financial forecast's authenticity.
Authenticity is a special problem because informational asymmetries are
great when dealing with future-based information. This Article consid-
ers whether external review or collateral disclosure undertakings can
overcome this problem. Part III develops a theory of why and how the
corporate interest can be served by harnessing the manager's insider
trading activity to the production and authentication of financial fore-
casts. This theory is developed through a proposed compensation sched-
ule for managers which looks toward market-based rewards. In Part IV,
the theory is contrasted with available evidence which surprisingly sup-
ports each important factor of the managerial compensation schedule.
The final part of the Article raises questions yet to be studied before fully
embracing the proposed compensation schedule.
I. SOCIAL VALUE OF FORECASTS
The value of any disclosure policy must be judged by its impact on the
allocational efficiency of securities markets. 15 In the context of financial
forecasts, this question is often debated in terms of the relative accuracy
of forecasts in general, with accuracy being the difference between the
forecasted amount and the level of activity achieved when the forecasted
event or period has occurred.16 So framed, the inquiry is whether re-
15. To improve allocational efficiency, more is required than merely facilitating the exchange
values established among shareholders. Production by affected firms must not only be affected, but
also be affected by an amount greater than the resources consumed in producing the information
released. See generally Hirschleifer, The Private and Social Value ofInformation and the Reward to
Incentive Activity, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 561 (1971); Fama & Laffer, Information and Capital Markets,
44 J. Bus. 289 (1971). For another disclosure problem whose social benefits are correctly analyzed
only in terms of its impact on the allocation of production resources and not by evaluating fairness as
between groups of investors, see Fox, Shelf Registration, Integrated Disclosures, and Underwriters
Due Diligence: An Economic Analysis, 70 VA. L. REv. 1005 (1984).
16. This indeed was the basis for the SEC's long-held position that financial forecasts were
inherently misleading and, therefore, inappropriate for inclusion in SEC filings. See Fiflis, supra note
12. Accuracy, however, has more often been raised when the question is whether firms should be
compelled to issue forecasts. See Schneider, Nits, Grits, and Soft Information ii SEC Filings, 121 U.
[Vol. 64:475
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sources are better allocated among competing investment opportunities if
the additional disclosed information is not accurate. Historically, there-
fore, the response to financial forecasts was evaluated solely in terms of
their accuracy.
The appropriate regulatory response to financial forecasts cannot be
premised upon an assessment of their accuracy. A significant weakness
in basing the determination solely upon the relative accuracy of forecasts
is that the conclusion that a certain proportion of reported forecasts are
in error of a certain amount is unimportant, unless there is knowledge of
what amount of deviation from the actual amount achieved is deemed
material to investors. Some assumption must invariably be made of the
variance between the figure forecast and the amount achieved which in-
vestors consider material as a predicate to assessing whether the forecast
serves or disserves investors. Furthermore, it is naive to assume investors
accept forecasts uncritically. They may, and most likely do, adjust man-
agement forecasts to their own estimate of the possible outcomes.
Even with the above caveats regarding accuracy as the standard for
evaluation, the data of financial forecasts supports a policy of encourag-
ing management forecasts. Although management forecasts are in error
by ten to fifteen percent,' 7 managers are not the only ones forecasting
their corporation's future likely performance. Security analysts more fre-
quently make published forecasts than do managers. Importantly, when
the accuracy of management forecasts are compared with those of ana-
lysts, management forecasts are the more accurate. 18
PA. L. REV. 254, 257-62 (1972); Note, Mandatory Disclosure of Corporate Projections and the Goal of
Securities Regulation, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1525, 1534-37 (1981).
17. Several studies have been made comparing financial forecasts of annual earnings or reve-
nues with the earnings or revenues achieved. See, e.g., Brown & Niederhoffer, The Predictive Con-
tent of Quarterly Earnings, 41 J. Bus. 488 (Oct., 1968); Copeland & Marionia, Executives' Forecasts
of Earnings per Share versus Forecasts of Naive Models, 45 J. Bus. 497 (1972); Cragg & Malkiel, The
Consensus and Accuracy of Some Predictions of the Growth of Corporate Earnings, 23 J. FIN. 67
(1968); Daily, The Feasibility of Reporting Forecasted Information, 46 Acr. REV. 686 (1971); Tull,
The Relationship of Actual and Predicted Sales and Profits in New-Product Introductions, 40 J. Bus.
233 (1967). For example, McDonald studied 201 predictions of net income made 8 to 12 months in
advance of the first announcement of the company's annual net income. He found that 35.3% of the
predictions were within 5% of reported net income; 48.8% were within 10% of actual net income;
and 39.8% were more than 15% from actual new income. McDonald, An Empirical Examination of
the Reliability of Published Predictions of Future Earnings, 48 Accr. REV. 502 (1973). The mean
actual prediction error in McDonald's study was 13.6%. It should come as no surprise that McDon-
ald's sample is consistent with that of other studies in revealing management's proclivity to over-
predict net income.
18. In a representative study contrasting management forecasts with those of outside analysts,
Number 2]
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The social welfare implication of this finding arises from the fact that
different information sets always elicit different stock price behavior. In-
creasing the frequency of the more accurate management forecasts im-
proves the allocational efficiency of capital markets more than one that
leaves the market to the less accurate analysts' forecast. 19 Otherwise, the
market is left to the less accurate analysts' forecasts. Hence, even if
judged on the basis of accuracy, encouraging managers' financial fore-
casting is socially desirable.2 °
The question of a forecast's accuracy is particularly important to in-
the mean forecast error for 88 management forecasts was found to be 10.1% whereas the analysts'
average error was 13.8%. Basi, Carey & Twark, A Comparison of the Accuracy of Corporate and
Security Analysts' Forecasts of Earnings, 51 AcCT. REV. 244, 249-50 (1976). See also Imhoff, The
Representative of Management Earnings Forecasts, 53 AccT. REv. 836, 845-47 (1978); Jaggi, Further
Evidence on the Accuracy of Management Forecasts Vis-a-Vis Analysts' Forecasts, 55 AcCT. REV. 96
(1980); Ruland, The Accuracy of Forecasts by Management and by Financial Analysts, 48 AcCT.
REV. 439 (1978). Analysts' forecasts, however, are more accurate than are the bare use of economic
forecasting models because analysts incorporate in their estimates a wider range of variables. See
Fried & Givoly, Financial Analysts' Forecasts of Earnings, 4 3. AcCT. & ECON. 85 (1982).
19. The relative accuracy of the two groups of forecasters implicates disclosure policies when it
is also evident that investors rely on both management and analysts. Gonedes, Dopuch & Penman,
Disclosure Rules, Information-Production and Capital Market Equilibrium: The Case of Forecast
Disclosure Rules, 14 J. Acer. RESEARCH 89 (1976).
20. A finding that a distinct form of financial announcement, such as a financial forecast, has
informational content does not in most cases establish that the disclosure policy should be to require
release of such information. Beaver, Implications of Securities Price Research for Accounting: A
Reply to Bierman, 49 AcCT. REV. 563, 570 (1974); Gonedes, Efficient Capital Markets and External
Accounting, 47 AcCT. REV. 11 (1972). But see Bierman, The Implications to Accounting of Efficient
Markets and the Capital Asset Pricing Model, 49 AcCT. REV. 557 (1974) (investor reaction is irrele-
vant to establishing disclosure policies). Bierman reasons that in formulating accounting principles,
policymakers should undertake to isolate those factors that measure "true earnings" or the firm's
"intrinsic value." His approach is much like gauging the worth of forecasts by their relative accu-
racy because in both instances he seeks disclosure policies which offer the best measure of the firm's
financial performance and position.
The optimal disclosure policy with respect to any single issue is far more encompassing than to
consider what serves the information needs of information users. Demski, Choice Among Financial
Reporting Alternatives, 49 AcCT. REV. 221, 227 (1974), reasons that the value of information can be
measured by observation, but such observed behavior provides no insight into the information's
social value. Demski's analysis, however, does not apply to financial forecasts, but rather to situa-
tions in which choices are being made between alternatives which embody the same information
content. The policy regarding forecasts is a choice between outsiders's forecasts and those of manag-
ers which, as seen above, have different information contents because of the greater accuracy of
management forecasts. As the body of users expands so that disclosure policy includes more than
investors and includes creditors, consumers, labor representatives and the government, the problems
in formulating a single coherent objective by which any disclosure practice is to be measured be-
comes impossible.
There is no method of selecting among social alternatives that is not dictatorial, but is Pareto-
optimal, independent of irrelevant alternatives, and provides a complete, transitive, and reflexive
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol64/iss2/5
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vestors considering whether to change their investment decision in re-
sponse to the forecast. Accuracy implicates the reliability of the
information contained in the forecast. Absent objective criteria or de-
vices which can either corroborate the forecast or attest to qualities of its
preparation, investors can only discount the forecast's information by the
average error for all forecasts. This is particularly true because all evi-
dence indicates that firms that forecast are not repeat players whose past
record for accurate forecasts can serve to authenticate their current fore-
cast. 2 The following section therefore reviews the contribution that ex-
isting authenticating devices make toward enhancing a forecast's
reliability in the eyes of investors.
II. THE AUTHENTICATION PROBLEM
The SEC was originally hostile to the inclusion of financial forecasts in
materials filed with the SEC because such information was believed in-
herently unreliable.22 The SEC evaluated the question only in terms of
the forecasts' accuracy. The forecasted amount invariably differed from
the amount actually achieved and, more importantly, the cause for such
difference could only be determined after the forecasted event's occur-
rence. The SEC did not believe that the forecast's preparation could be
externally examined at the time of its issuance in a manner which would
attest to its reliability. Hence, the SEC justified a strict prohibition on
forecasts. Although the SEC has changed its position dramatically with
respect to financial forecasts,2 3 the problem of a forecast's authenticity
has not changed. Of the several possible responses to this problem, none
appears satisfactory.
Accountants have always been greatly concerned with their role in
either the preparation or review of forward-looking information. Lack-
ranking of the social alternatives. See generally K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICES AND INDIVIDUAL
VALUES (2nd ed. 1963).
In formulating policy for disclosure to securities markets, the most important concern upon find-
ing an item has information content is the cost associated with the information's production and
dissemination. When, as is the case with financial forecasts, there is little cost, commentators typi-
cally conclude that the information should be disclosed. See, eg., Beaver, What Should Be the
FASB's Objectives?, 136 J. AcCT. 49, 53 (Aug. 1973); Gonedes, Efficient Capital Markets and Exter-
nal Accounting, 47 AcCr. REV. 11, 16 (1972).
21. One study of 121 forecasting firms over a four-year period found that only four issued more
than one annual earnings forecast. Jaggi & Grier, A Comparative Analysis of Forecast Disclosing and
Non-Disclosing Firms, 9 FIN. MGMT. 38, 39 (Summer 1980).
22. See supra note 10.
23. See supra note 10.
Number 2]
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ing the objective, completed events that are the linchpin for accountant
involvement in other verified functions, such as the annual report, their
involvement with financial forecasts places them in less familiar terrain. 4
Forward-looking information, however, is not entirely foreign to the ac-
countant. For example, they frequently review management forecasts,
but only as a means to better familiarize themselves with the many vari-
ables which interact within their audit of the company's operations.
25
Their involvement with financial forecasts is, therefore, relatively recent
and unexplored. Their major contribution apparently will be questioning
the assumptions on which any management forecast is premised.26 The
accountant's insight into the interactive financial, production and mar-
keting forces for the individual firm well qualify them to detect an egre-
gious imbalance among the forecast's assumption which seriously
undermine the forecast's reliability. It appears, however, that such an
awareness is likely to occur only in the most extreme cases. In other
words, the essential value of the forecast is its communication of new
information about the firm and its prospects, and the fact that manage-
ment's assumptions resonate poorly with those of the accountant should
not automatically negate the manager's assumptions. Management's in-
sight is both unique and better than that of outsiders and appropriately
deserves great deference. Accordingly, accountants demonstrate great
deference to management forecasts, especially when management has en-
joyed a past record of relative forecast or budget accuracy. If the attest
function is to succeed, the accountants' attitude should be skeptical in all
cases, regardless of the manager's past record. This, however, is not
likely to be the case.
Beecher v. Able" demonstrates the role of a forecast's assumptions. In
Beecher, Douglas Aircraft Company offered convertible debentures to
the public through a registration statement that predicted that the com-
24. See, e.g., Danos & Imhoff, The Auditor and Financial Forecasts, 151 J. AccT. 104, 109-10
(June 1981). The accounting profession's fear is essentially that their involvement will cause inves-
tors mistakenly to attach certainty to the forecast's predicted outcome. Hence, there may well be an
"over-authentication" problem. This appears to be an overstatement in view that any experience
with auditor's involvement would not only show that certainty is not being attested to, but also that
experience itself would be impounded into the discounting of the forecast announcement.
25. Id. at 107-09 & 111.
26. Danos & Imhoff, Factors Affecting Auditors' Evaluations of Forecasts, 21 J. AcCT RE-
SEARCH 473, 488 (Autumn 1983). Danos & Imhoff, Auditor Review ofFinancial Forecasting: An
Analysis ofFactors Affecting Reasonableness Judgments, 57 ACCT. REV. 39 (1982).
27. 374 F. Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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pany would break even for the year.28 Instead, the company reported a
$52 million loss because of continuing materials and labor shortages re-
lated to the Vietnam War. The court found that the company's predic-
tion assumed that these problems would be substantially overcome
during the forecast period.29 This assumption, however, was not dis-
closed in the registration statement. Like the break-even performance
management predicted, Douglas never overcame labor and material
shortages.
Beecher suggests that one response to the authentification problem is
to require disclosure of the underlying assumptions of the forecast. Dis-
closure of a forecast's underlying assumptions is believed to allow inves-
tors to assess independently the forecast's reliability in light of other
information available to them.3" Douglas' assumption that it could over-
come the problem of labor and material shortages is a clear illustration of
the limited instances in which disclosures collateral to the forecast would
improve the forecast's usefulness to investors. The assumption in
Beecher not only was the dominant factor in the forecast's achievement,
but also was not interdependent with other assumptions or events.
Moreover, the assumption involved a matter within the capacities of the
investment community to assess: the likelihood that labor and material
shortages which were plaguing the industry as a whole would continue.
The means to assess this variable were not solely within the domain of
Douglas' management. It was an industry-wide phenomenon for which
there was abundant public information.
Although Beecher underscores the protective benefits of disclosing as-
sumptions along with the forecast, in most instances these benefits are
problematic. The typical forecast assumptions are far more complex
than that in Beecher.3t  As expected, several assumptions will be in-
dependent of all other assumptions. A larger group of assumptions is
likely to exist which are interdependent with one another, but which
have varying amounts of correlation. Each assumption's impact on the
28. Id. at 346.
29. Id. at 351-52.
30. SEC Guide 62, Disclosure of Projections of Future Economic Performance, I Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 3822, provides that the SEC "believes that investor understanding would be enhanced
by disclosure of the assumptions which in management's opinion are most significant to the projec-
tions or are the key factors upon which the financial results of the enterprise depend .. "
31. An excellent description of the possible problems posed by assumptions is contained in C.
SCHNEIDER, FINANCIAL PROJECTIONS-PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF DISCLOSURE, FIFTH ANNUAL
INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 47, 59-63 (1974).
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forecasted figure is of a different and indeterminate magnitude. The fact
that many of the assumptions involve items for which outside investors
lack sufficient referents against which the reasonableness of the assump-
tion can be judges makes these distinctions even more difficult. Again,
the informational advantage of managers and the social worth of their
sharing that advantage through forecasts is evident by the vulnerability
of the market to challenge the forecast's reliability. For these reasons,
disclosure of assumptions improves the forecast's authenticity only when
the investors can reasonably evaluate the assumptions' appropriateness. 32
That is, collateral disclosure of underlying assumptions can enable the
market to assess independently the forecast's reliability, but usually when
the assumption is one which links the forecast's achievement with the
performance of the national economy or a particular industry. Items
that are highly idiosyncratic to the individual firm would not in most
cases prove useful to the user. Such collateral disclosures may even be
dysfunctional because the assumption may remove the preparer's com-
petitive advantage or share strategic planning with its competitors.
A third and final authenticating device is an affirmative undertaking of
the forecast's preparers to monitor the forecast and to update or correct
it whenever material differences appear likely.33 Such an undertaking, in
fact, is an affirmative duty of all forecasters. For example, in Financial
Industry Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corporation,34 an officer of
Douglas Aircraft forecast that the company would earn $3.15 per share
in its upcoming fiscal year.3 ' Five weeks later, Douglas' president
learned of continuing delays in production and commissioned a select
team to investigate the problem and its impact on the company's earn-
ings. The team soon determined that profits would not exceed $2.00 per
share for the upcoming fiscal year. Douglas issued a press release, stating
32. Id. at 60.
33. Section 11(a) of the Securities Act imposes a liability for the failure to correct a registration
statement up to its effective date. See Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 659 & 678
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (failure to correct filed registration statement to reflect changes in issuer's business).
Rule 14a-9 of section 14(a) of the Exchange Act imposes a duty to correct material in a proxy
statement. See Gould v. American Hawaiian Steamship Co., 351 F. Supp. 853, 868 (D.Del. 1972),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 535 F.2d 761 (3rd Cir. 1976). There, of course, is a more
pervasive duty to correct and update under the antifraud provision of the Exchange Act. See Ross v.
A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 607 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979); Thomas v. Duralite Co., 524 F.2d 577 (3rd Cir.
1975). See generally Bauman, Rule l0b-5 and the Corporation's Affirmative Duty to Disclose, 67
GEo. L.J. 935 (1979).
34. 474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir. 1973).
35. Id. at 519.
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simply that production difficulties were having an adverse affect on its
earnings.36 Matters continued to deteriorate, and the investigation con-
tinued, until Douglas refuted its earlier prediction.37
The effect of a duty to correct and update, as Financial Industrial
Fund illustrates, is to mitigate the harm of a forecast that either was
unreasonably prepared or has been interdicted by intervening forces
which adversely affect its achievement. The update, however, benefits
those who otherwise would have relied upon a stale forecast which be-
cause of a lapse of time and change in circumstances has become false.
The update, however, does not assist those who acquired the forecasting
firm's securities in the interval between the forecast and its update. As
the facts of Financial Industrial Fund reflect, this can be a considerable
interval of time. Moreover, because most price and volume changes as-
sociated with the forecast occur within a short time of its announce-
ment, 8 the update does not protect the vast majority of traders who rely
upon the forecast. Thus, the undertaking or obligation to proffer updates
provides a measure of authenticity only to remote users of the forecast.
The duty to update, therefore, renders the same protection for remote
users of financial forecasts as the prevalent liability standard for reck-
lessly prepared forecasts renders to their users. Each source of liability is
an authenticating device whose force comes from the liability it imposes
upon those who either recklessly prepare the forecast or shirk the obliga-
tion to update the forecast when circumstances require it. In combina-
tion their contribution is likely to occur only at the margins of most
forecasts and liability from either source therefore provides little addi-
tional assurance of the individual forecast's reliability.
The contribution of the three traditional responses to the financial
forecast authentication problem is quite modest. Neither individually
nor in combination do they hold much hope that the overall quality of a
forecast will be improved in the eyes of the market. In each instance, the
weakness of authenticating response has its source in the informational
asymmetries which are central to the act of forecasting. The information
base of accountants or investors is not as rich as that of the forecast's
preparers. When accountants review the forecast or the investors con-
sider the wisdom of any disclosed assumptions or later question whether
management recklessly prepared the forecast, each operates at a grave
36, Id at 520.
37. Id. at 517.
38. See infra note 53.
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disadvantage: they lack sufficient information. The ultimate authenti-
cating device, therefore, must be one which can overcome this informa-
tion gap. It is worth considering whether and how management's
informational advantage can be employed both to increase the frequency
of forecasts and to improve their authentication.
III. THE CORPORATION'S INTEREST
Because stockholders are concerned with maximizing their share val-
ues, they are well advised to pursue incentive arrangements whereby
their managers' discretionary choices are stimulated to have a favorable
impact on the firm's market value. Voluntary disclosure practices can
have such an effect because more publicly available inside information
will lower the firm's systematic risk attributable to informational asym-
metries between managers and stockholders. Therefore, in an asymmet-
rical market, stockholders should seek, to the extent it is efficient,
arrangements that will reward their managers for disclosure practices
which increase share values. Such an incentive would take the form of
compensating managers, at least in part, for intertemporal changes in the
firm's value.
Any managerial compensation schedule is an inherently complex ar-
rangement.3 9 Nevertheless, several basic features should be included.
Management's bonus would be a percentage of the interperiod change in
the firm's value. For example, assume a market is composed of only two
types of firms, Type A and Type B. Type A firms will have lower risk in
the upcoming fiscal period, t, than will Type B firms. However, each
firm's managers are the only persons who know whether their firm is a
Type A or Type B. Without any additional information, investors will
value each firm by capitalizing the earnings of each firm by the average
average risk category for all firms.40 The effect of this is that Type A
firms will be undervalued and Type B firms overvalued.
If the managers of Type A firms enjoy incentives that reward them for
increases in the firm's value, they will strive to distinguish their firm by
emitting a signal of their firm's unique characteristics. Absent a penalty
39. Professor Trueman has also found that among the important ingredients of an incentive
schedule designed to increase voluntary corporate disclosures is the need to restrict the insider's
trading prerogatives and to impose some penalty for false reporting. Trueman, Motivating Manage-
ment to Reveal Insider Information, 38 J. FIN. 1253 (1983).
40. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons" The Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,
84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970).
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for false signaling, managers of Type B firms could issue a similar signal
and thereby garner the short-term gains of their misdeeds. If such abu-
sive signaling occurred widely, the significance of the signal would be
devalued. Hence, to preserve the value of the currency employed to dis-
tinguish Type A and Type B firms, the optimal compensation schedule
will encompass more than changes in the firm's value during a single,
short fiscal period. The schedule must necessarily include a form of ex
post adjustment to penalize a manager who has falsely signaled his firm
as a Type A firm. Therefore, if a manager perceives at time period t that
their firms have Type A characteristics which will only be confirmed at
the close of a fiscal period t, he will issue a forecast announcement at t
and receive additional compensation. However, if at t a manager is un-
able to confirm his firm's Type A characteristics and, in fact, they are
Type B firms, the penalty would be imposed so that in the ex post adjust-
ment the manager minimally loses his gains garnered earlier at time t. 4 1
The courts' treatment of "scalping" violations under the federal securi-
ties law suggests a type of manager incentive which will produce reliable
forecasts that will assure their own authenticity. Scalping involves an
advisor's or analyst's secret purchase of a company's stock just prior to
recommending the stock to his client or investors generally. The
Supreme Court in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.42 held
that an investment advisor who frequently purchased shares of compa-
nies prior to recommending them to his clients, without also disclosing
his trading practices, violated the antifraud provision of the Investment
Advisors Act of 1940.43 The Court reasoned that if scalping were not
prohibited, investment advisors might succumb to the temptation to rec-
ommend stocks whose characteristics were more likely to assure a quick
and substantial price change following the recommendation.' Stocks of
small corporations with fewer outstanding shares are particularly appro-
priate for scalping, because a slight shift in demand for a thinly traded
stock will cause an unusually large change in its market price. More
importantly, Capital Gains did not proscribe the advisor's secret
purchase in advance of his recommendation. The advisor's breach was
his failure to disclose his prior purchase of the recommended stock as
41. A mathematical representation of the important features for a compensation schedule
designed to encourage voluntary disclosures is presented in the Appendix following this article.
42. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
43. 15 U.S.C. §§ 806-I to 6-21 (1982).
44. 375 U.S. at 196.
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well as his intent to sell the shares after a rise in the market. The Court
reasoned that such disclosure would enable investors to consider whether
the advisor is serving two masters or only one, "especially, . . . if one of
the masters happens to be economic self-interest.,
45
Scalping violations of the federal securities laws are easier to envision
when prosecuted, as in Capital Gains, under the Investment Advisors
Act because that Act is concerned with eliminating conflicts of interest
between the advisor and his clients. Disclosure of the advisor's position
in recommended stocks permits the client to evaluate more fully the dis-
interestedness of the advisor's recommendation. An increasing number
of scalping cases,46 however, have been brought under the antifraud pro-
vision of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 against individuals who are
outside the technical definition of an investment advisor.
Because the antifraud provision is not concerned with conflict of inter-
ests, its application to scalping emphasizes the informational value of the
defendant's potential to scalp. In the leading antifraud case, Zweig v.
Hearst Corp.,' Cambell, a financial columnist, purchased 5000 shares of
ASI just prior to publishing a highly favorable column about the com-
pany. The day after the column's publication, Cambell sold 2000 of his
ASI shares, thereby recouping his initial investment in all of the shares
he purchased.48 His trading practices in ASI repeated what he had done
on prior occasions. Over a two-year period, Cambell purchased stock in
21 companies prior to publishing favorable columns about each and then
sold the shares after the story's publication.49 The plaintiffs in Zweig,
stockholders of a corporation which ASI acquired, argued that Cambell's
scalping had inflated ASI's market price so that the merger's terms ap-
peared more favorable than if Cambell had disclosed his scalping scheme.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Cambell's failure to dis-
close in his column his earlier investment in ASI and his intent to sell the
45. Id.
46. For cases in which section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and section 206 of the Investment
Advisors Act are used interchangeably to reach scalping, see SEC v. Blavin, [1984-85 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,021 (6th Cir. 1985); In re Penny Stock Newsletter, [1984-85
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 83,722 (Dec. 19, 1984). Scalping practices can also
subject a brokerage firm to censure by an exchange in which the firm is a member. See In re Smith
Barney, Harris Upham & Co., [1984 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 83,656 (Aug. 15,
1984).
47. 594 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1979).
48. Id. at 1265.
49. Id. at 1264 n.4.
[Vol. 64:475
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol64/iss2/5
INSIDER TRADING REGULATION
shares after the column's publication violated the antifraud provision.5°
Scalping may be restated to reflect the principles of the before-de-
scribed incentive schedule. The practice implicates the advisor's motives
in proferring the recommendation and therefore the authenticity of that
recommendation. The advisor's failure to disclose his scalping plans mis-
represents the most important feature of an agency arrangement, the
agent's compensation schedule. The agent's compensation schedule al-
lows outsiders to evaluate the information's authenticity, at least in part,
by the disinterestedness of the advisor. The advisor who scalps reaps
gains outside his agency compensation schedule independent of the
worth of his recommendation. Moreover, these nonscheduled gains
erode any penalty the schedule may contain for poor performance. The
effect, therefore, of the federal securities laws' application to scalping is
to police the agency arrangement by compelling what the parties would
have agreed to if they could have bargained economically: full disclosure
of the agent's interest and gains in the subject matter of the agency
relationship.
To summarize, the violation in scalping cases is the nondisclosure of
the advisor's purchase and intent to sell after the recommendation is pub-
lished. Merely purchasing securities researched for a publication by itself
does not require prompt disclosure absent a recommendation. A recom-
mendation, therefore, is the sine qua non of a scalping violation.51 Prior
to a recommendation, the advisor's isolated purchase is devoid of infor-
mational content. After a recommendation is proffered, the advisor's
trading activity, past and future, has great meaning to investors assessing
the recommendation's authenticity. Moreover, investors, if informed of
the advisor's purchase of the recommended security, will react more pos-
itively to the recommendation if the advisor undertakes not to change his
ownership before notifying the investor. Such an undertaking ties the
advisor's recommendation to the interests of the advisee in that recom-
50. In fact, the duty imposed on Cambell was even broader than this because the court ex-
tended the duty not only to those who read his column, but also to all traders in the recommended
company's stock. The recommended stock in Zweig was American Systems, Inc., and the plaintiffs
were stockholders of Reading Guidance Center, Inc., which was being acquired by American Sys-
tems for a total price of $1.8 million. The exact number of ASI shares to be issued in the merger was
determined by the market price of the stock during the first five trading days of June, 1969, the
period following Cambell's column. Hence, Cambell's disclosure obligation was important for the
market to price efficiently the shares of ASI. Id. at 1269-71.
51. See Fleischer, Mundheim, & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry into the Responsibility to Disclose
Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 798, 828-35 (1973).
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mendation's authenticity. Under the above compensation schedule, the
advisor's undertaking not to sell before a stated time exposes the advisor
to a "penalty" of losing value to any market price decline if his advice is
wrong.
Insider trading regulation can be similarly justified. Just as disclosure
of the advisor's trading design for a recommended stock affords insight
into the recommendation's authenticity, it may be reasoned that permit-
ting managers to trade in their firm's stock may encourage them to en-
gage more frequently in voluntary disclosures, and also that disclosure of
the insider's trading position will enhance each disclosure's authenticity.
Hence, by first stimulating greater corporate disclosures and, second, im-
proving the authenticity of those disclosures, the corporate interest is
thereby served by reducing the firm's cost of capital because of the inves-
tor's favorable reaction to such heightened and improved disclosures.
With this interest in mind, regulation of insider trading becomes a legiti-
mate corporate objective. It serves to harness the insider trading activity
to fulfill the corporation's desires to stimulate voluntary disclosures and
to improve the authenticity of those disclosures.
IV. DISCLOSURE INCENTIVE: THEORY MEETS PRACTICE
The act of voluntarily disclosing information, particularly the issuing
of a financial forecast, fits nicely into the incentive compensation sched-
ule described above. That is, evidence exists that supports the belief that
firms seek to distinguish themselves, as did the Type A firms above, by
releasing financial forecasts. Moreover, a market-based financial gain se-
cured by the forecast announcement guides, at least partially, manage-
ment's incentive to release such a forecast. Finally, there is reason to
believe that a market-based penalty also exists if the forecast is improp-
erly proffered.
All studies of financial forecasts have found that investors alter their
assessments of the firm's worth in response to financial forecasts, thus
confirming the informational value of management forecasts. 52 The sig-
nificance of such studies lies not in their confirmation of what many may
52. See, eg., Jaggi, A Note on the Information Content of Corporate Annual Earnings Forecasts,
53 AccT. REv. 961 (1978); Foster, Stock Market Reaction to Estimates of Earnings Per Share by
Company Officials, 11 J. AccT. RESEARCH 25 (1973); Gonedes, Dopuch & Penmand, supra note 19;
Patell, Corporate Forecasts of Earnings Per Share and Stock Price Behavior: Empirical Tests, 14 J.
AccT. RESEARCH 246 (1976). For example, Patell, found a significant change in the price ofsccuri-
ties during the week that management released its forecast.
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consider the obvious, but in their revelation that the market reacts signifi-
cantly and positively even though management forecasts can be consid-
ered "bad news" because the forecasted amount is below what investors
could have reasonably extrapolated from other sources. Significant price
and volume changes are associated with a forecast announcement. The
price change is positive, even though the forecasted amount is below that
anticipated by investors prior to management's announcement. 53 The
market's counterintuitive positive response to the so-called "bad news"
forecasts can only be explained in terms of the concurrent message the
act of forecasting signals.54 An understanding of this phenomenon be-
gins with a consideration of the properties of firms releasing financial
forecasts.
The cause for the abnormally positive change in return associated with
a forecast's announcement is not known, but may be attributed to the
usual information content involved with the act of issuing a forecast, as
distinguished from the forecasted amount. Because companies are not
required to offer financial forecasts, the self-selecting feature of forecast-
ing ensures that those that do forecast have unique characteristics. These
characteristics support the belief that the act of forecasting is an impor-
tant form of signaling engaged in by managers to increase their firm's
market value. This value enhancement occurs importantly by reducing
the firm's riskiness in the eyes of analysts. In this regard forecasts are
53. Penman's study of investor reaction to 1,188 financial forecasts not only supports the infor-
mation properties of financial forecasts, but also offers interesting insights into the stock price reac-
tion to "good news" and "bad news" forecasts. Penman, An Empirical Investigation of the Voluntary
Disclosure of Corporate Earnings Forecasts, 18 J. AccT. RESEARCH 132 (1980). By using daily data,
Penman offers insight into the markets response each day of the forecast's announcement. As in the
case of Patell's study, supra note 52, Penman found no significant difference in investor reaction to
forecasts which were greater than could be extrapolated from past reported performance and fore-
casts which were significantly below those that could have been so anticipated. Id. at 157.
54. A. SPENCE, MARKET SIGNALING 1 (1974). Signaling arises when there is uncertainty
about the reliability of information. Information users may therefore rely upon certain associations
to provide the requisite basis for their decisions. For example, Spence illustrates how employers may
employ information about an applicant's educational attainments, job experience, race or sex to
access the applicant's probable productivity. In this way, these characteristics become part of the
applicant's information outputs just as the applicant's unsupported statement that he is a "hard
worker" is such an output, but one not as objectively verifiable. Spence's signaling model is adapted
to the multi-period forecast-disclosure setting in Penman, Corporate Forecast Disclosure, Substitute
Information, and the Market for Information, Chapter II (Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Chicago,
1978). Forecasts are not the only type of voluntary disclosure which can be attributed to the signal-
ing hierarchy that develops when firms with distinct qualities recognize that unless a message is
emitted that favorable quality will not be associated with the firm. See, e.g., Ronen & Livnat, Incen-
tives for Segment Reporting, 19 J. ACCT. RESEARCH 459 (1981).
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most frequent among firms which enjoy low fluctuations in year-to-year
earnings.55 Higher risk firms, i.e., those with great earnings variability,
are less likely to proffer a forecast.5 6 Also, forecasting firms have lower
earnings variability in the fiscal period after their forecast than do com-
parable nonforecasting firms. 7 Moreover, managers are more likely to
forecast if earnings are increasing than when earnings are declining. 8
Thus, there is a greater frequency of forecasting during periods of growth
in the national economy than where there is a recession. 9 In sum, the
forecast is a means for managers to communicate their optimism of the
firm's position and future operations in a way that causes investors to
associate the forecasting firms in a less risky category than if the same
firm did not engage in forecasting. In terms of the earlier two-type firm
illustration, the act of forecasting distinguishes the forecasting firm as a
Type A firm.
55. See Imhoff, supra note 18 at 844 (paired firms not issuing forecasts had greater earnings
variability than forecasting firms, but that forecasting firms had greater systematic risk than the
composite systematic risk of firms comprising the Standard and Poors Industrial 500 Index). Cox,
Further Evidence on the Representativeness of Management Earnings Forecast, 60 ACcT. REV. 692
(1985), however, found that forecasting firms did not have greater systematic risk than nonforecast-
ing firms. The reason for firms with lower earnings variability being the most frequent forecasters
may well be management's aversion to forecasting an amount that will differ materially from the
level ultimately achieved. In this regard, consider that more forecasts are offered by public utilities
which also have the best record for accuracy. McDonald, supra note 7, at 510; Patell, supra note 52,
at 251-52.
56. Jaggi & Grier, A Comparative Analysis of Forecast Disclosing and Non-Disclosing Firms, 9
FIN. MGMT. 38 (Summer 1980), found that growth in earnings was not a variable that distinguished
forecasting from nonforecasting firms. As between sets of firms which both enjoyed high growth
rates, those with the lowest expected future earnings variability proffered forecasts whereas those
whose earnings variability would continue to be great in the future did not forecast. Id. at 42-43.
See also Cox, supra note 57, at 698. Jaggi & Grier's findings are disturbing because reliable forecasts
would be most helpful to investors for firms with the greatest earnings variability. However, the
volatility of their earnings make their own predictions most problematic. It may be that managers of
such firms are themselves unable to forecast future performance. Related to earnings variability is
firm size with larger firms having less variable earnings. Daily, The Feasibility of Reporting Fore-
casted Information, 46 AccT. REV. 686 (1971), is alone in finding that firm size is unrelated to
forecast error. The greater frequency of forecasts among firms with lower expected variability also
suggests that managers are averse to forecast an amount that will materially differ from the level
actually achieved, most likely because of the market's penalty for materially misleading signals. See
infra text accompanying notes 66-72. Hence, when there is much less risk of a material deviation of
actual from the level forecast managers are more likely to forecast.
57. See Jaggi & Grier, supra note 56.
58. See McDonald, supra note 17, at 505.
59. Id. Furthermore, the degree of management optimism in overpredicting is related to gen-
eral economic conditions. Gray, The Role of Forecast Information, in INVESTMENT DECISIONS IN
PUBLIC REPORTING OF CORPORATE FINANCIAL FORECASTS 28 (1974).
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Further evidence of managers' trading practices in connection with
their forecast announcements brings voluntary disclosure within the hy-
pothesized incentive compensation schedule. In what some may call re-
sourcefulness, managers appear to have systematically developed their
own compensation schedule when forecasting their firm as Type A firms.
In a study of insider trading activity before and after forecast announce-
ments, insiders were found systematically to time their purchases and
sales in relation to forecast announcements.' They were thereby able to
earn abnormal returns on their trading.6' Moreover, the strength of the
correlation between the frequency of insider purchases and their fore-
casts was directly related to the forecast's ultimate impact on the secur-
ity's market prices.6 2 Insiders, therefore, not only are privileged in their
ability to know when a forecast will be announced, but also are excellent
judges of whether an upcoming forecast announcement will cause a ma-
terial increase in the stock's price.
Related to the empirical evidence of managers' propensity to purchase
shares in advance of their forecast announcement is the question of what
variables skew forecasts so that a far greater number of forecasts are of
"good news" rather than "bad news." 63 Although management's inch-
60. Penman, Insider Trading and the Dissemination of Firm's Forecast Information, 55 J. Bus.
479 (1982). Studies of other corporate announcements have also found they are preceded by signifi-
cant insider trading activity. See Elliott, Morse & Richardson, The Association Between Insider
Trading and Information Announcements, 15 RAND. J. ECON. 521 (1984); Keown & Pinkerton,
Merger Announcements and Insider Trading Activity: An Empirical Investigation, 36 J. FIN. 855
(1981).
61. Penman, supra note 60, at 485-93. In this respect, there have been several reported in-
stances in which an alleged misleading favorable forecast has been accompanied by an insider selling
his corporation's stock. See, e.g., Beldman v. Goldman, 754 F.2d 1059 (2d Cir. 1985).
62. Penman, supra note 60, at 485-93.
63. Id. at 484. See also studies cited supra note 53. Indeed, management's bias toward early
reporting of good news announcements is well-documented. See, e.g., Chambers & Penman, Timeli-
ness of Reporting and the Stock Price Reaction to Earnings Announcements, 22 J. AccT. RESEARCH
21 (1984) (annual reports bearing good news are released earlier than are annual reports which
disclose bad news); Patell & Wolfson, Good News, Bad News, and the Intraday Timing of Corporate
Disclosures, 57 AccT. REv. 509(1982) (bad news systematically delayed, whereas good news is re-
leased earlier). Indeed, there is something of a hierarchy based on the time in which reports are
issued so that when quarterly reports are studied in terms of both their good news and bad news
qualities as well as their timeliness, it is found that bad news reports which are released early carry
less negative stock price reaction than do bad news reports that are released late. Kross & Schroe-
der, An Empirical Investigation of the Effect of Quarterly Earnings Announcements Timing on Stock
Returns, 22 J. ACCT. RESEARCH 153 (1984). See generally Givoly & Palmon, Timeliness of Annual
Earnings Announcement: Some Empirical Evidence, 57 AcT. REv. 486 (1982); Niederhoffer &
Regan, Earnings Change Analysts' Forecasts and Stock Prices, FIN. ANALYSTS J. 65 (May-June
1972); Lurie & Pastena, How Promptly Do Corporations Disclose Their Problems?, FIN. ANALYSTS J.
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nation to report the good and to conceal the bad as long as possible may
be so dominant that any economical financial incentive cannot overcome
it, current securities law rules prohibits managers from creating their
own market-based incentives to release bad news. Section 16 of the Se-
curities Exchange Act prohibits insiders of large public corporations
from short trading in their corporation's registered securities. 6  The em-
pirical dominance therefore of "good news" forecasts may be seen as re-
flecting managers' compliance with the provisions of section 16 so that
they lack sufficient incentives to release unfavorable news. 65
Evidence also suggests that securities markets impose their own penal-
ties when managers proffer a false signal of a firm's future vitality.
Although this question remains to be examined in the context of forecast
announcements, in a related area of market signaling, the announcement
of a stock dividend,66 ample evidence exists of the market's response to
false signaling. The financial significance of a stock dividend announce-
ment is widely ascribed to the same message as that suggested above for a
financial forecast, namely a signal of management's optimism for the
firm's continued extraordinary financial performance.67  The market in-
55 (Sept.-Oct. 1975); Pastena & Ronen, Some Hypotheses on the Pattern of Management's Informal
Disclosures, 17 J. AccT. RESEARCH 550 (1979). The proclivity to conceal "bad" news has fueled the
SEC's current active enforcement efforts directed toward "cooked" books. See Hudson, Fidelity
S&L Disclosures Faulted by SEC as Giving 'Impression of Business as Usual' Wall St. J., Aug. 2,
1982, at 34, col. 2.
64. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (c). Carlton & Fishel, supra note 13, at 893-94, reason short trading may
encourage executives to make superior corporate decisions.
65. See Penman, supra note 60, at 484.
66. The naive investor often uses the expression stock dividend and stock split interchangeably.
This confusion has given rise to the accounting profession's promulgation of guidelines for differing
accounting treatment for each depending on the expected reaction to investors. See ARB No. 43,
Ch. 7, Stock Dividends and Stock Split-Ups (A.I.C.P.A. 1953). The accountants presume that share
increases less than 20-25% of the affected shares are presumed to be a stock dividend for which the
corporation's retained earnings must be capitalized in an amount equal to the shares' market value,
This position is based on the view that investors react positively to announcements of stock divi-
dends because they view them as the functional equivalent to cash dividends, but view the larger
percentage increase of a stock split as merely an increase in the shares outstanding with no effect on
shareholder wealth. Leading event studies do not support the distinctions the accounting profession
draws between its treatment of stock dividends and stock splits. See infra note 67 and accompanying
text. See generally W.G. LEWELLEN, THE COST OF CAPITAL 113-17 (1969).
67. One of the most celebrated event studies found a significant increase in the returns for firms
announcing a stock split (defined as an issuance of at least five shares in exchange for four outstand-
ing shares), which was lost in the months following the announcement by firms which failed to
increase their overall dividends. Fama, Fisher, Jenson & Roll, The Adjustment of Stock Prices to
New Information, 10 INT'L EcON. REv. 17 (1969). See also Chottiner & Young, A Test of the
AICPA Differentiation Between Stock Dividends and Stock Splits, 9 J. AccT. RESEARCH 367 (1971);
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol64/iss2/5
INSIDER TRADING REGULATION
terprets the stocks dividend announcement as presaging an overall in-
crease in dividends. Such an increase is doubly important because in
Litner's classic study68 of managerial discretion over company dividends,
he found that managers will increase dividends to a new level only when
they believe the firm's future earnings are so certain that the firm will be
able to maintain the new dividend under all economic conditions.
Firms that announce stock dividends are characterized by extraordi-
nary rates of return in the months prior to the announcement. 69 Accom-
panying the above average returns for these firms is increasing systematic
risk in the months prior to the announcement.7 ° The increasing risk for
the firm reflects the market's growing uncertainty whether, and for what
duration, the firm can continue to sustain its extraordinary returns. The
market's reaction to the stock dividend announcement confirms this ex-
planation: the announcement is followed by a material decline in the
announcing firm's systematic risk,7' suggesting that uncertainty regard-
ing the firm's future prospects is alleviated with the announcement of a
stock dividend. The stock dividend announcement does not always oc-
cur at the same time that the firm's prospective cash dividend is declared.
Examination of the market's response to firms whose managers ulti-
matelyfail to increase dividends after an earlier declared stock dividend,
a false signaling case, reveals a market-based penalty for false signaling.
When dividends are not increased after an earlier stock dividend an-
Foster & Vickrey, The Information Content of Stock Dividend Announcements, 53 ACCT. REV. 360
(1978).
68. Litner, Distribution of Income of Corporations Among Dividends, Retained Earnings and
Taxes, 46 AM. ECON. REV. 97, 99-103 (1956), found that once dividends have been increased, man-
agement of publicly-held corporations reduce dividends only with great reluctance and then the
reduction is made only under the most exigent circumstances. Importantly for present analysis is
that forecasts of earnings elicit an even stronger reaction from the market than does management
signaling its optimism through an increase in dividends. See Penman, The Predictive Content of
Earnings Forecasts and Dividends, 38 J. FIN. 1181 (1983). This strength of a forecast announcement
vis-a-vis dividend announcement may be due to the noise that the latter contains. For example,
dividend increases which include an increase in the percentage of earnings being distributed, the so-
called dividend payout ratio, are greeted less enthusiastically by the market than a dividend increase
that does not increase the payout ratio. Divecha & Morse, Market Response to Dividend Increases
and Changes in Payout Ratio, 18 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 163, 168 (1983). This differ-
ing treatment may be attributed to the differing tax treatments between earnings which are retained
in the firm and thereby add value (and which are ultimately taxed at the preferential capital gains
rates) and dividends which are taxed at higher ordinary income rates.
69. Bar-Yosef & Brown, A Reexamination of Stock Splits Using Moving Betas, 32 J. FIN. 1069
(1977).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1072.
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nouncement, the firm's systematic risk increases and remains at that level
for a significant period of time.72 The market's disproportionate response
after concluding that a stock dividend announcement was a false signal
of financial vigor and stability can therefore be seen as a penalty similar
to that captured in the earlier described compensation schedule. The
market's reaction which creates this penalty appears particularly well-
advised. After the false signaling, the firm's variable earnings record
continues and is exacerbated by management's apparent willingness to
signal falsely.
The above empirical evidence is consistent with the suggested compen-
sation schedule. Managers can and presumably do view it as advanta-
geous to offer forecast announcements, and systematically share in their
firm's increased value following the announcement through trading in
advance of the forecast.73 Because managers dislike increases in their
firm's systematic risk, they have an incentive to signal their optimism and
to do so honestly. Otherwise their firm will encounter higher rather than
lower cost of capital. Because these effects benefit stockholders, everyone
would benefit from harnessing the manager's discretion in a compensa-
tion schedule which formally seeks these objectives. Indeed, private con-
tractors would see it is to their advantage to go even further than the
empirical data marshalled above suggests. They would include in their
agreement a means by which the managers would authenticate their fore-
72. Id. at 1072-73. Similarly, firms which either omit or significantly cut their dividends there-
after reflect greater systematic risk due to investor negative reaction to this signal. Dielman & Op-
penheimer, An Examination of Investor Behavior During Periods of Large Dividend Changes, 19 J.
FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 197, 203 (June 1984). Correlatively, firms that resume dividends
or increase their dividends materially reduce their market risk. Id.
73. See Downes & Heinkel, Signaling and the Valuation of Unseasoned New Issues, 37 J. FIN. 1
(1982) (entrepreneuer's purchase of firm's stock not only signals his faith in firm's future, but also
reduces the frequency of his deviations from the goal of maximizing share values); Leland & Pyle,
Information Asymmetries, Financial Structure and Financial Intermediation, 32 J. FIN. 371 (May
1977) (insiders' investment in own projects are signal of project's soundness). In Gilson & Kraak-
man, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv. 549 (1984), investor knowledge of
insider trading practices is referred to as a "derivatively informed trading mechanism" and one of
the informational sources which guide market efficiency. They express a view similar to that above
in stating that the question is not whether to permit insider trading but whether derivatively in-
formed trading mechanism can be made to operate more efficiently. Id. at 629-32. They point out
that under current practices investors learn of the insiders trading through reports filed under sec-
tion 16 of the Exchange Act only after the insiders have traded. They suggest a solution different
from above in that they recommend that insiders announce their intention to trade a reasonable time
in advance of their trading. Professors Gilson and Kraakman, however, did not consider the role of
insider trading in terms of either encouraging voluntary disclosure or authenticating disclosures
which may have caused them to alter somewhat the timing of the insider's trading.
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cast announcement with a commitment not to reverse their trading posi-
tions until the end of the forecasted period after reporting the level of
activity actually achieved.74 Thus, the parties would restrain the man-
ager's ability to change his trading position prior to the forecasted event's
occurrence. This restriction serves the dual function of authenticating
the announcement and penalizing false signaling.
V. INCENTIVES, OPPORTUNITIES, AND IMPLICATIONS
The above-described data, even though consistent with the proposed
incentive schedule, is not at this point complete enough to compel the
schedule's adoption. Many more questions must be answered. For ex-
ample, there are more instances of forecast announcements that are not
accompanied by the manager's trading than those in which the man-
ager's trade prior to the forecast's release. Thus, the forecast may well
present only an opportunity for a private gain, but that prospect of gain
may not be the force behind the forecast's preparation or release. Also,
market-based incentives may exist that are more efficient than insider
trading which provide the necessary incentives for managers to forecast.
Moreover, firms that forecast are consistently among firms characterized
by future levels of profitability and risk that are unique vis-a-vis the mar-
ket as a whole. These are factors that not only are independent of the
managers' incentive schedule, but also appear to dominate over the man-
ager's personal incentive schedule. Firms whose managers profit directly
from increases in the value of firm's shares, but which lack the buoyant
qualities that predominate among forecast firms, probably will still not
issue forecasts. Thus, licensing managers to purchase secretly in advance
of a forecast may well have no impact on the frequency of financial fore-
casting across firms generally.
Quite independent of the impact of insider trading on the frequency of
financial forecasting is the question of whether and to what extent disclo-
74. In this way, disclosure of the insider's trading decision can itself characterize forecasts as
"good" or "bad" news. For example, in Golden v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059 (2d Cir. 1985), the court
was faced with whether a forecast of a 40-50% rise in sales was material in view of the fact that the
predicted increase was significantly below that in each of the prior four years. An insider's disclo-
sure of his decision to purchase shares in reliance upon the forecast is consistent with a "good" news
characterization of the forecast. However, in Golden, the corporation's vice-president sold a signifi-
cant number of shares following the forecast. His trading served no authenticating function, but
only signaled his belief that the current price was a good one. Had his intent to sell been disclosed in
the forecast announcement, the market's response is not likely to have been as strong as it was and,
of course, the vice-president would have received less for his shares.
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sure of their trading will in fact authenticate the forecast. As the scalp-
ing cases demonstrate, disclosure of the advisors' trading practices is
intended to enable investors to judge the recommendation in light of all
of its preparer's possible incentives. An undertaking not to change the
preparer's trading position in the affected security until a stated event,
the passage of the forecast period, reveals a great deal about its preparer's
faith in the forecast or recommendation. However, it remains unex-
plored in the financial forecast area whether other market forces are such
that they provide ample authentication of the forecast. That is, other
managerial compensation devices which are tied to the firm's financial
performance or changes in value of its shares may make the forecast's
preparers' additional undertakings superfluous.
Related to the authentication question is whether it is necessary to li-
cense inside trading for both "good' and "bad" news reports.75 In this
context there is a well-documented reluctance by managers to release
"bad" news. To be sure, so-called "bad news" forecasts are issued.
These forecasts earn their pejorative title, however, not because they
forecast a loss, but rather because the forecasted amount is less than
would be predicted based upon the firm's past performance. A truly
"bad news" forecast, one which projects a loss, is unlikely to overcome
the manager's other incentives which cause them to delay such a negative
report on the firm and managers' performance. Moreover, authentica-
tion of unexpected "bad news" is not a problem. In fact, the market
responds more quickly to unexpected "bad news" than it does to "good
news,"76 suggesting that the report's content itself provides its own au-
thentication. This authentication lies in the verified practice of managers
not to report such "bad news" if it can be avoided. Thus, on the basis of
available evidence it hardly appears justified to consider section 16(c)'s of
75. Negative soft information is generally delayed until the information's release is considered
an inevitability. Negative news is more frequently released in the months just prior to the close of
the firm's fiscal year. This is explained not by the manager's incentive compensation schedules, but
rather by managers' feeling that the information's disclosure is inevitable in view of the upcoming
audit by its independent accountants. See generally Pastena & Ronen, Some Hypotheses on the
Pattern of Management's Informal Disclosures, 17 J. AccT. RESEARCH 550 (1979).
76. See Joy, Litzenberger & McEnally, The Adjustment of Stock Prices to Announcements of
Unanticipated Changes in Quarterly Earnings, 15 J. AccT. RESEARCH 207 (1977) (whereas prices
respond slowly to quarterly earnings announcements that exceed expected earnings by 20-40%, the
response is quite rapid when quarterly earnings decline by 20-40% from the expected level). A case
in point is the quick and significant decline in Warner Communication, Inc. when it predicted earn-
ings would be substantially below the earlier predicted level. Landro, Warner Says 8 Atari Unit
Executives Sold Shares Before Report Spurred Stock Slide, Wall St. J., Dec. 27, 1982, at 3, col. 2.
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the Exchange Act prohibition against short-selling as the major impedi-
ment to management forecasting a future loss.
The final implication of licensing insider trading for the narrow pur-
pose of encouraging and authenticating financial forecasts is the accom-
panying necessity to prohibit strictly insider trading in all other
connections. If a market-based incentive schedule is to have its twin im-
pacts of encouraging and authenticating forecast announcements, an un-
qualified need exists to restrict managers from seeking gains off that
schedule. This need is based on the realization that if managers can
freely trade on insider information which arises through no acts of their
own, their incentive to produce value increasing events, such as a fore-
cast, is reduced. Moreover, if the manager can secretly sell more shares
than the announced forecast disclosed he purchased in reliance upon the
forecast, the authenticating contribution of his purchase is completely
eroded.77 Insider trading must therefore be prohibited except when it
serves the corporate interest, if the manager's actions are to be under-
stood in terms of his public incentive structure.
77. Any linkage of the insider trading practices with the larger corporate aims of improving
voluntary disclosure practices must deal with the reality that insiders will not comply fully with the
detailed restrictions and concomitant record keeping such a linkage necessitates. The wide-ranging
abuses under § 16's reporting requirements do not support the belief that insiders will fulfill their
obligations. See 16 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1248 (July 27, 1984); Hudson, Many Directors
Ignore SEC Filing Rule on Stock Trades Nader Study Concludes, Wall St. J., Dec. 5, 1983, at 36, col.
3.
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APPENDIX
INCENTIVE COMPENSATION SCHEDULE AND MARKET
SIGNALING
The following is undertaken to describe the conditions which enable
forecasting to become a signal. The illustration begins with the assump-
tion of a simple economy in which only two types of firms exist: Type A
firms and Type B firms, wherein the return between the beginning of the
time period, to and the end of the time period, t1, of each type of firm is a
and b, respectively, with a>b. The returns, whether a or b, to be
achieved during the fiscal period are known at t= o only by the managers
of the respective firms. For additional simplicity, the market for each
firm's return is assumed to be risk neutral. Therefore, if investors could
distinguish A and B firms, their respective values V0 A and Vo at time 0
would be
_ a b
v°A- 1+r > V°' - 1+r
where r represents the discount rate equal to the riskfree rate of interest.
If the investors are unable to distinguish at to or t, type A and B firms,
all firms will be valued equally as a single indistinguishable group. Inves-
tors will capitalize the average returns for all firms in valuing any firm.
Because of such averaging process by investors necessitated by their in-
ability to distinguish between the two firms, the value placed on A firms
will be less than their "true" value and the value placed on B firms
greater than their "true" value.
Implicit in the assumption that managers of the firms know the re-
turns, i.e., whether a or b of their respective firm at to is the assumption
that a value for the firm at to and t can be reasonably estimated. This
assumption is not a surprising one. For example, at the end of the fiscal
period, at t, a firm reports its earnings to date, and in an efficient capital
market the stock's price impounds this information so that measurement
of the change in the firm's value during the fiscal period, and hence the
return achieved by its owner over that fiscal period, can then be deter-
mined. The market's past pricing movements allows managers to make
reasonable estimates of the stock's price following announcement of its
earnings for a fiscal period. The magnitude of such changes is a joint
result of the change in a firm's performance from that of a prior period
and the extent the announcement differs from the news anticipated by
the market from other sources or corporate announcements.
Managers of both Type A and Type B firms are assumed to be com-
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pensated by an incentive schedule which, among other features, increases
their compensation proportionately to increases in the firm's value in se-
curity markets. This assumption offers the incentive for the managers of
Type A firms to distinguish their firms from Type B firms with the objec-
tive of seeing their firms' securities priced in the market so that VoA > VoB.
Because the value of each type of firm can be objectively verified at t1,
Type A managers have an incentive to identify their firm prior to t1, only
if they prefer near to later enjoyment of their compensation.
If managers do not prefer the near term enjoyment of their compensa-
tion they can merely wait until the actual results are achieved to realize
their compensation, such as through announcement in the annual report
compelled under federal or state law. The condition that managers pre-
fer near term enjoyment of their compensation is therefore an important
one for explaining the incentive driving management to disclose at t, that
their firm is a Type A firm. Forecasting at to, the firm's return as a for
the upcoming fiscal period, results in an increase in the firm's value and
ultimately facilitates management realizing a proportionate share of that
gain through their compensation schedule. Absent a forecast, managers
must await announcement of the actual return achieved at t1.
Absent some further clarifying information regarding management's
compensation schedule, moral hazard renders direct statements by Firm
A managers to the effect that they are Type A firms ineffective; Firm B
managers could give the same statement. Such a response by both Type
A and Type B firms' managers will return the stock-valuing process at to
to the position where investors are compelled to capitalize the average
expected returns for all firms (Type A and B) when valuing any firm's
security. One method to avoid this difficulty is to assume that the mana-
gerial compensation schedule is far more encompassing than compensat-
ing the manager for increases in the firms' value. Proportionate sharing
in declines in the firm's value must also be included. And as will be seen,
investors must be aware of the compensation schedule's terms if effective
signaling is to take place.
An outline of each manager's compensation (M) schedule is
Mo+ 1 = y (VifV >F)
(VI-P if V, < F)
where V, and V, are the respective values of the firm at times 0 and 1; P
is the penalty imposed if the forecast of value of the firm, F, at time = 1
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is less than the actual value of the firm; and y is the nonnegative percent-
age of the manager's share in a change in the value of the firm between
time periods. Thus, Firm A managers forecasting that they are Type A
firms, so that subsequent actual performance proves the forecast to be
correct, reap at t, a proportionate share, y, of their gain. Necessarily,
this compensation schedule must have certain retrospective features. To
wit, comparison of F to V, can only be made at t= 1 and if F>V, the
gains garnered through the false signal will be recouped from the man-
ager through the penalty imposed upon the manager. At the same time,
the compensation schedule must include increases in value at t=0 by the
forecasting of V1. Simply, the compensation schedule begins by confer-
ring upon managers their share of the firm's change in value at the mo-
ment a forecast is impounded in the price of the firms' security and
extends until the actual results for the fiscal period are so that V, is
known. This allows both the manager's compensation to be enjoyed ex
ante, but equally important, permits an ex post settling up in the event of
"false" forecasting.
The compensation schedule must contain a penalty provision to re-
move the incentive to represent falsely Type B firms as Type A firms.
Otherwise a Type B firm manager may enjoy the interest free use be-
tween T=O and T= 1 of the differences in value between Type A and
Type B firms through falsely representing his firm to be a Type A firm.
Absent the penalty imposed in the expost settling up, only the managers'
proportionate share, y, of the increase in the firm's value due to the false
statement would be recouped. Such a recovery does not include the util-
ity the manager obtained during the period between t, and t, through
enjoyment of the incremental compensation obtained falsely.
Upon the above compensation schedule being both established and un-
derstood by managers and investors, a signaling equilibrium occurs.
Firm A managers forecast their V, values at 0 and reap the immediate
enjoyment awarded under their compensation schedule. Since they reap
no reward by deferring their compensation and prefer the immediate en-
joyment of any compensation due them, the above compensation sched-
ule offers a powerful incentive to forecast VIA at t=0. To be sure, Type
B managers may also forecast their VIB at t=0. If that is equal to VoB
there is no gain, and hence, no incentive under the compensation sched-
ule to forecast falsely. Type B managers may falsely forecast at t=0 that
their value at t=0 will be VIA. The investors, unable to distinguish their
false forecast from a true forecast will respond uncritically. But Type B
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managers will in addition to being required to return their excessive
share of the increase in the firm's value attributable to the false signal at
t = 0, also incur the penalty which will erode the near term advantage of
the false statement.
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